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TORT LAW-HEDONIC DAMAGES-ARKANSAS'S APPLICATION OF
HEDONIC DAMAGES TO WRONGFUL-DEATH SUITS: Is ARKANSAS'S
METHOD MISCONCEIVED?
I. INTRODUCTION
Undoubtedly, Deck Shifflet, Danny DeVito's character in John Gri-
sham's The Rainmaker,' aptly captured the interests at stake in a wrongful-
death case when he said, "Now it's a wrongful-death suit: gazillions." 2 Re-
gardless of whether this statement should be criticized or praised, it says
something very important about what survivors and their attorneys seem to
expect from a jury in a wrongful-death suit: The statement implicitly com-
municates that the anticipated response from a jury is a large monetary
judgment. Where does this notion come from? Is it a product of lore? Is it
an allusion to the monetary value lost after a life is wrongfully ended? Or
does this notion just reflect basic truths about the procedures and laws that
govern damages in wrongful-death cases? Ultimately, all three of these sup-
positions are likely true, but the last carries significant implications for the
reliability and validity of jury awards in wrongful-death suits.
Wrongful-death suits are unique in that they require jurors to place a
value on human life. In light of this unique nature, courts have typically
given jurors broad latitude in calculating wrongful-death damages awards.4
Yet, it is precisely this discretion that makes Deck Shifflet's crass declara-
tion troubling. In circumstances where the nature of damages, like that of
hedonic damages, requires jurors to consider notions of intangible loss,
there exists a potential for excessive or arbitrary awards.s It is roughly axi-
omatic that a wrongful death engenders certain emotional responses. What
is not so certain, however, is what results when those responses come in
contact with a legal system that does not provide a principled approach to
calculating intangible harms.
In 2001, the Arkansas General Assembly amended Arkansas's survival
statute by adding language that permits an estate or a survivor to recover a
decedent's loss-of-life damages as an "independent element of damages.",
Interestingly, the Arkansas Supreme Court has held that loss-of-life damag-
es compensate "for the loss of the value that the decedent would have
1. JOHN GRIsHAM's THE RAINMAKER (Paramount Pictures 1997).
2. Id.
3. STUART M. SPEISER & JAMEs E. ROOKS, JR., RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH §
11:2 (4th ed. 2009). For a definition of "hedonic damages," see infra Part I.B.
4. Id.
5. See generally Ronald J. Allen, Alexia Brunet, & Susan Spies Roth, An External
Perspective on the Nature of Noneconomic Compensatory Damages and Their Regulation,
56 DEPAUL L. REv. 1249 (2007).
6. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-62-101 (LEXIS Repl. 2005).
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placed on his or her own life."7 The Arkansas Supreme Court has provided
jurors little guidance in determining appropriately a loss-of-life award. At
most, the court has said that jurors must find some evidence that the dece-
dent valued his or her life, and that, due to the probable lack of direct evi-
dence, jurors may consider circumstantial evidence to establish this value.8
In considering Arkansas's loss-of-life jurisprudence as a whole, it is
clear that there are at least two fatal flaws. First, the Arkansas General As-
sembly's 2001 amendment to the Arkansas survival statute cannot be legal-
ly justified. Given that the historical purpose behind survival statutes has
been to maintain those claims that a decedent would have been entitled to
had he or she lived, there is no true connection between a survivor's claims
and a loss-of-life injury. This note suggests that to solve this first problem
the General Assembly must move its 2001 amendment language to the text
of Arkansas's wrongful-death statute.
Second, and far more disquieting, is that the cumulative effect of Ar-
kansas's loss-of-life jurisprudence infringes on defendants' due process
rights. The value that an individual "would have placed on his or her own
life" is difficult to establish; how could anyone quote or agree to such a
value with any sense that he or she was accurate? Moreover, armed only
with the instruction that they should determine some value through direct or
circumstantial evidence, Arkansas jurors are left with a less than principled
method for establishing loss-of-life damages. Arguably, this lack of guid-
ance leaves Arkansas jurors with enough discretion to expose a defendant to
an arbitrary deprivation of property.
The problematic features of Arkansas's loss-of-life law are merely im-
plications of a broader issue that is inherent in the calculation of non-
economic damages in general: the potential for excessive or arbitrary
awards.9 This broader issue, some commentators say, may be remedied by
an imposition of safeguards that are in keeping with the limitations recently
placed on punitive damages awards by the Supreme Court of the United
States. The two specific safeguards that these commentators suggest are (1)
informing jurors of a range of non-economic awards given in factually simi-
lar cases (otherwise known as comparability review), and (2) a two-tiered
standard of appellate review.10 As applied to Arkansas's loss-of-life struc-
ture, these suggested revisions will not only provide a more principled ap-
7. Durham v. Marberry, 356 Ark. 481,492, 156 S.W.3d 242,248 (2004).
8. See infra text accompanying notes 166-70.
9. Allen et al., supra note 5, at 1275; Paul DeCamp, Beyond State Farm: Due Process
Constraints on Noneconomic Compensatory Damages, 27 HARv. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 231, 235
(2003). But cf JoEllen Lind, The End of Trial on Damages? Intangible Losses and Compa-
rability Review, 51 BuFF. L. REV. 251, 322 (2003) (arguing that comparability review fails to
treat intangible loss as unique to each tort victim).
10. DeCamp, supra note 9, at 235. But cf Lind, supra note 9, at 322.
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proach to loss-of-life valuation; they will also protect defendants' procedur-
al due process rights.
To be clear, this note argues two things: first, because recovery of post-
mortem hedonic damages is inconsistent with the historical purposes of
survival statutes, the Arkansas General Assembly needs to move the 2001
amendment language to the text of the Arkansas wrongful-death statute;
second, given the Supreme Court's position on the constitutionality of puni-
tive damages awards, it is clear that Arkansas's method for calculating loss-
of-life damages poses a real threat to defendants' procedural due process
rights; thus, reform is necessary.
This note will first address the location of the loss-of-life statutory lan-
guage by examining the legal purposes and theories supporting wrongful-
death and survival statutes in general and by uncovering the theoretical and
practical weaknesses in allowing recovery for loss-of-life damages under
Arkansas's survival statute." Second, this note will expose the due process
concerns innate in Arkansas's loss-of-life scheme and propose a solution: a
two-step remedy that would bring Arkansas's loss-of-life damages calcula-
tion within the acceptable bounds of due process. 12 Last, this note will con-
clude with a summary of these arguments.
II. THE ARKANSAS GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S 2001 AMENDMENT LANGUAGE
IS MISPLACED
In order to understand the implications of the General Assembly's
2001 amendment, it is necessary for one to have a general knowledge of the
background and purposes underlying wrongful-death and survival statutes.
This section will first trace the development of wrongful-death and survival
statutes while focusing on the technical purpose and operation of each type
of statute. Following this discussion, this note will discuss the problems
behind the current placement of the 2001 amendment language and propose
that a sufficient solution would be to move that language to the text of the
Arkansas wrongful-death statute.
A. Wrongful-Death and Survival Statutes
At common law, there were three general rules that governed claims
resulting from a wrongful death.14 First, a victim's claims died with the tort-
feasor if the tortfeasor died before the victim could bring his or her cause of
action; second, a tort victim's claim was extinguished upon the victim's
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part IUI.
13. See infra Part IV.
14. DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 8.3 (2d ed. 1993).
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death; and third, a "victim's survivors had no independent claim of their
own against the tortfeasor for the loss of their support or for their grief and
sorrow."15 The combined effect of these three rules meant that "'it was
cheaper for the [tortfeasor] to kill the plaintiff than to injure him [or her],
and that the most grievous of all injuries left the bereaved family of the vic-
tim . .. without a remedy."' 16 In order to preempt the effect of these com-
mon-law rules, British Parliament passed Lord Campbell's Act in 1846. 17
Upon the wrongful death of an individual, this act created a new cause of
action that permitted statutorily recognized beneficiaries to recover the
losses they suffered as a result of a decedent's death.'8
Shortly after Parliament passed Lord Campbell's Act, many American
jurisdictions followed suit with their own wrongful-death statutes.' These
states modeled their statutes closely after Lord Campbell's act by incorpo-
rating the same underlying theories and purposes. 20 The underlying purpose
common to both Lord Campbell's Act and most early American wrongful-
death statutes was to protect dependent survivors from a loss of susten-
ance.21 It is important to note that these adopting states saw their wrongful-
death legislation as a type of "social welfare" that protected survivors' pe-
cuniary interests in the decedent's income.22 Today, many states have kept
their wrongful-death statutes true to form by focusing on the loss to the sur-
*23vivors.
15. Id.
16. Joseph A. Kuiper, Note, The Courts, Daubert, and Willingness-to-Pay: The Doubtful
Future of Hedonic Damages Testimony Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 1996 U. ILL. L.
REv. 1197, 1216 (1996) (quoting W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 127, at 945 (5th ed. 1984)).
17. Lori A. Nicholson, Note, Hedonic Damages in Wrongful Death and Survival Ac-
tions: The Impact of Alzheimer's Disease, 2 ELDER L.J. 249, 254 (1994); see also Kuiper,
supra note 16, at 1216 n.120.
18. BRILL, supra note 17, § 34:1.
19. Id.
20. Id. The Arkansas General Assembly modeled the Arkansas wrongful death act after
Lord Campbell's Act. HOWARD W. BRILL, ARKANSAS LAW OF DAMAGES § 34:1 (5th ed.
2008).
21. DOBBS, supra note 14, § 8.3(1); see also 0. FRED HARRIS, ARKANSAS WRONGFUL
DEATH AcriONS § 1-2 (1984); Andrew Jay McClurg, It's a Wonderful Life: The Case for
Hedonic Damages in Wrongful Death Cases, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 57, 93 (1990).
22. DOBBS, supra note 14, § 8.3(1) ("The initial purpose was undoubtedly more related
to a limited version of social welfare than to corrective justice.").





A large majority of contemporary wrongful-death statutes create new
causes of action that survivors may use to recover damages for personal
losses sustained as a result of a decedent's death.24 Today, most states still
hold to the traditional understanding that wrongful-death statutes exist to
compensate survivors for their losses. 25 These jurisdictions, which are
commonly known as loss-to-survivor jurisdictions, calculate survivors'
losses by measuring "the present value of probable contributions which the
deceased would have made to the survivors, which . . . [may] include[] the
value of a parent's training, guidance, nurture and education." 2 6 Beyond
these pecuniary damages, loss-to-survivor jurisdictions also allow recovery
of funeral and medical expenses as well as any possible inheritance that the
decedent might have left and any administrative expenses or attorney's
fees. 27 Furthermore, some loss-to-survivor jurisdictions have permitted re-
covery of non-pecuniary damages such as loss of companionship or loss of
28society.
b. Loss-to-estate jurisdictions
Over time, another approach to calculating wrongful-death damages
has developed; namely, the loss-to-estate method of calculation. 29 Rather
than focusing on the loss that a decedent's survivors sustained, the loss-to-
estate theory of calculation is concerned solely with the injury that the death
caused the decedent's estate.30 Under this approach, courts will calculate the
loss in one of three ways: "(1) the present value of decedent's probable fu-
ture net earnings; (2) the present value of decedent's probable future accu-
24. DOBBS, supra note 14, § 8.3(1).
25. McClurg, supra note 21, at 93.
26. SPEISER& ROOKS, supra note 3, § 6:3.
27. Id.
28. Id. There are roughly five different types of loss-to-survivor wrongful death statutes:
(1) those providing only in general terms for fair and just damages; (2) those including a
nonexclusive list of available types of damages; (3) those including an exclusive list of avail-
able types of damages; (4) those specifically limiting damages to pecuniary losses of the
survivors; and (5) those which otherwise make clear that the damages are for injuries suf-
fered by the survivors because of the death. Statutes falling into the first two groups do not
preclude judicial recognition of damages for the value of lost life; whereas those falling
within the last three categories do. McClurg, supra note 21, at 96.
29. DOBBs, supra note 14, § 8.3(1).
30. McClurg, supra note 21, at 93.
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mulations; and (3) the present net worth of decedent's probable future gross
earnings."30
There are four circumstances under which jurisdictions may incorpo-
rate the loss-to-estate method of calculation:
(1) hybrid survival-death statutes, which are essentially survival actions
enlarged by statute or judicial decision to include damages in the same
action for wrongful death; (2) true wrongful death statutes, construed to
measure damages by loss to the estate; (3) wrongful death statutes which
measure damages by the loss to the survivors, except where the decedent
is not survived by any statutory beneficiary, in which case damages are
measured by the loss to the estate; and (4) wrongful death statutes which
measure damages by the loss to the survivors, but allow the decedent's
personal representative to recover specified items of damages such as
medical and funeral expenses on behalf of the estate.32
With the exception of a small minority, most states do not allow recov-
ery of loss-of-life damages in a wrongful-death suit. 33 Those that do are
typically loss-to-estate jurisdictions, and they generally apply a liberal in-
terpretation of their wrongful-death statutes.34 At least one commentator has
suggested that "[c]ompensating the decedent's estate for all losses inflicted
by the wrongful death could logically include compensation for the dece-
dent's loss-of-life itself."35
2. Survival Statutes
Unlike wrongful death statutes, survival statutes do not create new
causes of action. 6 Causes of action predicated on a state's survival statute
are not based on loss experienced upon or after the death of a decedent.37
Rather, the historically and modernly typical survival statute limits survival
causes of action to recovery for a victim's claims that arose before his or her
death. After the death of a tortfeasor, or the wrongful death of a victim, a
survival statute will "keep the [victim's] preexisting injury claim[s] alive . .
31. SPEISER & RooKs, supra note 3, § 6:52; see also id. §§ 6:53-:56.
32. McClurg, supra note 21, at 93-94.
33. Nicholson, supra note 17, at 258.
34. SPEISER & RoOKS, supra note 3, § 6:60.
35. McClurg, supra note 21, at 97-98 (arguing that the deficiencies in the pecuniary loss
rule can justify modification of a wrongful-death statute or at least judicial reconstruction to
allow for recovery of loss-of-life damages).
36. HARRIS, supra note 21, §§ 1-2.
37. McClurg, supra note 21, at 91.
38. Id at 90.
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. as an asset of [his or her] estate, and limit damages to those that occurred
from the time of injury until death."3 9
As will be discussed later," courts that have considered the nature of
loss-of-life damages have classified such damages as post-mortem hedonic
damages, i.e., damages incurred after death. 41 Given the limited scope of
survival statutes, claims for post-mortem hedonic damages by definition fall
outside the reach of a survival action because a claim for post-mortem he-
donic damages is based on the harm sustained as a result of the decedent's
42sttt
death; the decedent's death caused or is the injury. A survival statute
merely permits recovery for those damages that a decedent would have had
had he or she lived.4 3 Thus, the paradox in allowing recovery for post-
mortem hedonic damages through the provisions of a survival statute is that
a decedent would not have a claim for loss of life or a loss of enjoyment had
he or she lived."
B. Amending the Arkansas Survival and Wrongful-Death Statutes
Before 2001, Arkansas did not permit plaintiffs to recover post-mortem
hedonic damages on behalf of a decedent. 4 5 However, in 2001, the Arkansas
General Assembly amended the Arkansas survival statute4 with language
39. Id. at 91; see also DOBBS, supra note 14, § 8.3.
40. See infra Part III.B.
41. Durham v. Marberry, 356 Ark. 481, 492, 156 S.W.3d 242, 248 (2004) ("[S]ince
loss-of-life damages can only begin accruing at the point when life is lost, at death, there is
no reason to believe the legislature intended to require the decedent to live for a period of
time between injury and death.").
42. McClurg, supra note 21, at 91; SPEISER & RooKs, supra note 3, § 6:45.
43. DOBBS, supra note 14, § 8.3; McClurg, supra note 21, at 91.
44. McClurg, supra note 21, at 91; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 926
(1979) ("[Tihe death of the injured person limits recovery for damages for loss or impairment
of earning capacity, emotional distress and all other harms, to harms suffered before the
death . . . ."); BRILL, supra note 17, § 34:1 A ("Apart from the personal injury action, the
administrator may assert any claim that the decedent could have asserted if he had lived.");
Cindy Domingue-Hendrickson, Wrongful Death-New Mexico Adopts Hedonic Damages in
the Context of Wrongful Death Actions: Sears v. Nissan (Romero v. Byers), 25 N.M. L. REv.
385, 387-88 (1995) ("[S]urvival statutes probably preclude post-mortem hedonic damages
for wrongful death, because loss of the value of life itself necessarily occurs after death.").
45. Bailey v. Rose Care Ctr., 307 Ark. 14, 20-21, 817 S.W.2d 412, 415 (1991); see also
BRILL, supra note 17, § 34:1B ("Arkansas has traditionally not permitted damages for the
decedent's loss of enjoyment of life.").
46. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-62-101 (LEXIS Repl. 2005). The Arkansas Model Jury In-
structions do not have a separate jury instruction for loss-of-life damages. The modification
that the Arkansas Supreme Court Committee on Jury Instructions made was to the Measure
of Damages-Wrongful Death-Cause of Action instruction. See ARK. MODEL JURY INSTR.,
CiVIL AMI 2216 (2009); see also Durham v. Marberry, 356 Ark. 481, 156 S.W.3d 242
(2004); Ali M. Brady, Note, The Measure of Life: Determining The Value of Lost Years After
Durham v. Marberry, 59 ARK. L. REv. 125, 132 (2006). Because the 2001 amendment to the
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that gave a "decedent's estate" the ability to "recover for the decedent's loss
of life as an independent element of damages" in addition "to all other ele-
ments of damages provided by law."4 7 In a very palpable way, however,
such an amendment seems out of place with what is commonly understood
as the underlying rationale for survival statutes.48
As previously stated, it is commonly understood that the only claims a
survivor may assert through a survival cause of action are those that the
decedent would have been entitled to had he or she lived.4 9 Through its
holdings, both before and after the 2001 amendment, the Arkansas Supreme
Court has made this general rule the well-established rule in Arkansas.o
Given the Arkansas Supreme Court's disposition, then, it should follow that
recovery for post-mortem hedonic damages and a survival action are by
survival statute was remedial in nature, the Arkansas Supreme Court has held that it should
be applied retroactively. McMickle v. Griffen, 369 Ark. 318, 339, 254 S.W.3d 729, 747
(2007).
47. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-62-101 (LEXIS Repl. 2005). One commentator suggests that
the Arkansas General Assembly intended the amendment to assist plaintiffs in recovering
damages for the wrongful death of a fetus. Brady, supra note 46, at 132 nn.59-60. This
commentator notes other 2001 amendments such as the amendment to the Arkansas Wrong-
ful-Death Statute, which included "viable fetus" in the definition of a "person," and the
amendment to the probate code that established the administration, settlement, and distribu-
tion of the estate of a viable fetus. Id. The Supreme Court of Arkansas has declined to ad-
dress whether the evidence required for establishing loss-of-life damages for a viable fetus is
quantitatively and qualitatively the same as that required for establishing wrongful-death
damages for a viable fetus. One Nat'l Bank v. Pope, 372 Ark. 208, 214 n.4, 272 S.W.3d 98,
103 n.4 (2008). It would likely be impossible to present evidence on the value that the fetus
would have placed on his or her life.
48. See Sterner v. Wesley Coll., Inc., 747 F. Supp. 263, 273 (D. Del. 1990) ("We con-
clude that plaintiffs in the present action may not recover for the hedonic value of the dece-
dent's lost life as a distinct basis for recovery under the Delaware survival action statute.").
49. McClurg, supra note 21, at 91; see also BRILL, supra note 17, § 34:1A. But see
Durham, 356 Ark. at 492, 156 S.W.3d at 248.
50. Estate of Mulkey v. K-Mart Co., No. 4:07CV00632 JLH, 2008 WL 2073929, at *2
(E.D. Ark. May 13, 2008) (unpublished); Myers v. McAdams, 366 Ark. 435, 439-40, 236
S.W.3d 504, 507 (2006); see also BRILL, supra note 17, § 34:1A; HARRIS, supra note 21, § 2-
2. In his treatise, Harris notes this point:
In Davis v. Railway, [53 Ark. 117, 13 S.W. 801 (1890)], [t]he supreme
court held that the action under the survival statute for the benefit of the
decedent's estate was separate and distinct from the action under the
wrongful death statute for the benefit of the next of kin. According to the
court, the action grounded upon the survival statute was simply the de-
ceased's cause of action which accrued at the time of injury and covered
the period from the injury to the death of the deceased person.
Id. (footnotes omitted). One could argue that the Arkansas Supreme Court's holding in
Myers v. McA dams with regard to the limitations of the Arkansas survival statute implicitly
overruled the court's contrary holding in Durham v. Marberry through inconsistency.
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definition simply incompatible. Nonetheless, the Arkansas General Assem-
bly amended the Arkansas survival statute with language that allows for the
recovery of loss-of-life damages. It is this note's position that no legal
theory supports the current placement of this language and that, if loss-of-
life damages are to remain available to Arkansans, the Arkansas General
Assembly must move the 2001 amendment language to the text of the Ar-
kansas wrongful-death statute.
Professor Andrew McClurg suggests that while the purposes behind
wrongful-death statutes do not easily dovetail with loss-of-life theory,
courts willing to broadly construe their respective state's wrongful-death
statutes could theoretically allow recovery of loss-of-life damages in a
wrongful-death action."1 Professor McClurg asserts that because loss-to-
estate jurisdictions measure loss by determining the loss that the decedent's
estate sustained as a result of the decedent's death, they are more predis-
posed to a construction in favor of loss-of-life recovery.5 2 McClurg argues
that because loss-to-estate jurisdictions focus the "inquiry . . . towards as-
sessing the injury that the death . .. caused to the decedent's estate, [and]
not [that] caused to the survivors," there is room to argue that "losses to the
decedent's estate resulting from the death logically should encompass all
losses suffered by the decedent from the death-including the value of his
[or her] life." 5 3 In fact, the Arkansas General Assembly itself has already
taken one step towards the loss-to-estate method of calculation by couching
the theory of loss in terms of loss to the "decedent's estate."5
While this solution has the potential to raise separate issues,55 it is at
least the lesser of two evils. The theoretical connection between a dece-
dent's loss-of-life damages and recovery of those damages only stands to
benefit from the relocation of the amendment language, and, as long as the
Arkansas General Assembly and the Arkansas Supreme Court are accepting
of Professor McClurg's suggestions, there is a colorable argument that such
a connection is legally justified. 56
51. McClurg, supra note 21, at 93.
52. Id. at 94.
53. Id.
54. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-62-101(b) (LEXIS Repl. 2005) ("In addition to all other ele-
ments of damages provided by law, a decedent's estate may recover for the decedent's loss
of life as an independent element of damages." (emphasis added)).
55. E.g., what is the theoretical connection between a decedent's loss of life-a loss that
is personal to the decedent-and the loss that an estate experiences as a result of the dece-
dent's death?
56. See McClurg, supra note 21, at 94.
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III. THE PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS CONCERNS UNDERLYING
ARKANSAS'S LOSS-OF-LIFE JURISPRUDENCE
As previously discussed, this note submits that Arkansas's loss-of-life
damages jurisprudence infringes on defendants' due process rights. In an
attempt to illustrate the problem, the following section will first discuss the
largely common natures of non-economic damages and hedonic damages.
Given that loss-of-life damages comprise a subset of hedonic damages, this
background is significant because most, if not all, of the unconstitutional
proclivities found in Arkansas's procedure for calculating loss-of-life dam-
ages parallel those found in the procedures for determining non-economic
damages awards. After this discussion, this section will explain how the
Supreme Court's recently imposed limitations on punitive damages awards
are instructive for forming solutions to the due process problems in non-
economic damages in general. Next, this section will provide the back-
ground to Arkansas's loss-of-life jurisprudence. Last, this section will ana-
lyze the unconstitutional facets of Arkansas's loss-of-life scheme and show
how increased guidance for jurors and increased judicial scrutiny may miti-
gate these issues.
A. Non-Economic Damages
In theory, tort damages serve two purposes: deterrence and compensa-
tion. 57 Tort law adequately satisfies its compensatory function to the extent
that it enables courts to calculate reliably the value of a victim's harm and
effectively distribute this amount to the victim or plaintiff.58 While the de-
terrent function of tort damages is important and well established, courts
typically calculate damage awards on the basis of compensation to the vic-
tim.5 9
In most personal-injury or wrongful-death cases, victims suffer eco-
nomic or special damages that are readily identifiable through monetary
amounts such as medical expenses or lost wages. 0 Additionally, in some of
those cases, tort victims suffer what are commonly known as general or
non-economic damages.6 1 Unlike economic damages, non-economic dam-
57. Brian Walker, Lessons that Wrongful Death Tort Law Can Learn From the Septem-
ber 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 28 REv. LITIG. 595, 596 (2009).
58. Id.
59. Kyle R. Crowe, Note, The Semantical Befiircation of Noneconomic Loss: Should
Hedonic Damage Be Recognized Independently of Pain and Suffering Damage?, 75 IOWA L.
REv. 1275, 1275-76 (1990).
60. Id at 1275.
61. Lars Noah, Comfortably Numb: Medicalizing (and Mitigating) Pain-and-Sufering
Damages, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 431, 433 (2009). Though a growing number of commen-
tators consider the nature of non-economic damages to be inconsistent with the compensato-
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ages do not find their basis in finite pecuniary figures.62 Instead, non-
economic theory encompasses a wide range of non-pecuniary harm.63 The
types of non-economic loss range from "pain, mental anguish, anxiety, emo-
tional distress, . . . nervous shock," loss of consortium, and hedonic losses
such as loss of enjoyment and loss of life. 4 To establish the value of non-
economic harm, courts place the determination of non-economic awards
within the "enlightened conscience of impartial jurors."6 Ultimately, these
jurors must find some substantial evidence on which to base their judgments
with regard to non-economic harm.66
Not surprisingly, the intangible nature of these types of loss has stirred
much debate among legal commentators. Some commentators have gone so
far as to describe non-economic damages as "subjective, totally unmeasure-
able, and wide open to exaggeration and falsification."6 These individuals
also argue that non-economic damage awards are incapable of serving a
compensatory function because no amount of money could ever bring




Hedonic damages comprise a subset of non-economic damages. They
are non-economic in the sense that they compensate plaintiffs for intangible
losses that are not derived from readily calculable pecuniary amounts. As
ry function of tort damages, a large majority of states have recognized a wide array of non-
economic harms. See generally Richard Abel, General Damages are Incoherent, Incalcula-
ble, Incommensurable, and Inegalitarian (But Otherwise a Great Idea), 55 DEPAUL L. REv.
253 (2006); Mark A. Geistfeld, Due Process and the Determination of Pain and Suffering
Tort Damages, 55 DEPAUL L. REv. 331, 352-55 (2006); McClurg, supra note 21, at 66-67.
62. Noah, supra note 61, at 432-33.
63. Id. at 432. Some commentators have found it conceptually difficult to reconcile the
compensatory function of tort damages with non-economic theory. Those who do not see a
correlation between monetary awards for non-economic loss and the compensatory function
of tort damages argue that money is incapable of making whole a personal-injury or wrong-
ful-death victim after they have suffered emotional distress or even death. See Abel, supra
note 61, at 258-59; Noah, supra note 61, at 433-34. This note makes no argument for or
against the justification of non-economic or hedonic damages.
64. Noah, supra note 61, at 432.
65. SPEISER & RooKs, supra note 3, § 11:2.
66. Id.
67. J. T. H. JOHNSON, OuR LIABILITY PREDICAMENT 105 (1997).
68. Joseph Sanders, Reforming General Damages: A Good Tort Reform, 13 ROGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REv. 115, 141-43 (2008) ("[A]warding money for pain and suffering leaves
the legal system open to the criticism that it is monetizing something upon which a dollar
value cannot be placed, thus violating our well-founded sense of incommensurability.").
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the title suggests, hedonic damages exist to compensate injured parties for
their loss of life or loss of enjoyment of life's pleasures. 69 A large distinc-
tion between hedonic theory and other theories of calculation is that hedonic
theory conceptualizes life's worth as intrinsically and objectively valuable;
a value that is independent from net worth, earning potential or any other
- 70financial interest.
For instance, in wrongful-death actions, a majority of states limit a
survivor's damages to the finite, monetary losses that he or she sustained as
a result of the decedent's death.7' To calculate these types of losses, lawyers
and economists use what is commonly known as the pecuniary-loss
theory.72 Under the pecuniary-loss theory, an individual's life is worth his
or her earning power or potential . The most common pecuniary loss calcu-
lation arrives at the value of an individual life by subtracting that individu-
al's consumption expenses from the value of the individual's expected earn-
ings at the time of his or her death.74
Rather than recycling theories of pecuniary loss into its valuation
scheme; however, hedonic theory treats life as independently valuable.75
While pecuniary-loss theory makes the value of life about the measure of
financial support an individual provided to his or her family, hedonic theory
"account[s] for the value of the decedent's life in its own right." 76 As stated
by Stanley V. Smith, the economist credited with coining the phrase "he-
donic damages," hedonic value "refers to the larger value of life ... includ-
ing economic, including moral, including philosophical, including all the
value with which you might hold life." 77
69. Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Hedonic Damages: The Rapidly Bubbling
Cauldron, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1037, 1041-42 (2004); ("'Hedonic,' is from the Greek
'hqdon(9)' or 'hgdonik6s,' meaning 'pleasure' or 'pleasurable."'); cf SPEISER & ROOKS,
supra note 3, § 6:44 (criticizing the use of the phrase hedonic damages); McClurg, supra note
21, at 60 n.8 (preferring the phrases value of lost life, lost life damages, or damages for the
intrinsic value of life, to describe post-mortem hedonic damages because they do not carry
the negative connotation of hedonism).
70. Kuiper, supra note 16, at 1204-05.
71. McClurg, supra note 21, at 62-63.
72. Jack E. Karns, Economics, Ethics, and Tort Remedies: The Emerging Concept of
Hedonic Value, 9 J. Bus. ETHICS 9, 707 (1990).
73. McClurg, supra note 21, at 63.
74. Kuiper, supra note 16, at 1204.
75. Id. at 1205-06 (citing RICHARD A. PALFIN & BRENT B. DANNINGER, HEDONIC
DAMAGES: PROVING DAMAGES FOR LOST ENJOYMENT OF LIVING 15-16 (1990)); see also
Nicholson, supra note 17, at 252-53.
76. McClurg, supra note 21, at 63.
77. Sherrod v. Berry, 629 F. Supp. 159, 163 (N.D. Ill. 1985), rev'd on other grounds,
856 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1988).
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Within this context, it is important to note that "hedonic damages are
not individually tailored."78 Under hedonic theory, it is not appropriate to
calculate the value that a specific individual placed on his or her life be-
cause "hedonic estimates are socially focused, seeking to measure the in-
trinsic value society at large places on the life enjoyment of an average,
anonymous human being." 79 Because hedonic loss involves the value of life
in the abstract and not an individual's pecuniary loss, statistical valuations
such as "average, anonymous human being" estimates play an important
role in keeping hedonic awards true to their theoretical underpinnings.80
2. Two Types of Loss
Hedonic theory recognizes two main categories of loss: loss of enjoy-
ment and loss of life.8 ' The factor that differentiates these two types of loss
is the time at which each respective loss occurs in relation to the decedent's
death. 82 Although a continuity of terms in the universe of hedonic theory is
still lacking, most commentators consider loss of enjoyment to pertain sole-
ly to hedonic loss experienced before death (ante-mortem).
a. Loss of enjoyment
A party experiences a loss-of-enjoyment when he or she suffers an in-
jury that limits or completely inhibits his or her ability to derive pleasure
from life's activities and pursuits." The only limit to the type of experience
78. Kuiper, supra note 16, at 1206; see also Thomas R. Ireland & James D. Rodgers,
Hedonic Damages in Wrongful Death/Survival Action: Equitable Compensation or Optimal
Life Protection?, 2 J. FORENSIC EcoN. 1, 46 (1992) ("[H]edonic valuation systems are not
designed to measure the life values of specific individuals."). But see SPEISER & ROOKS,
supra note 3, § 6:44 ("Hedonic loss can be divided into two components. The first component
is the general loss of enjoyment of life that an average individual would experience as a
result of an injury .... The second component consists of a specific loss that is unique to a
particular individual.").
79. Kuiper, supra note 16, at 1206.
80. Id
81. McClurg, supra note 21, at 60 nn.8-9.
82. See id. at 60 n.9.
83. Durham v. Marberry, 356 Ark. 481, 487-92, 156 S.W.3d 242, 245-49 (2004); see
also Samuel R. Bagenstos & Margo Schlanger, Hedonic Damages, Hedonic Adaptation, and
Disability, 60 VAND. L. REv. 745, 748-49 (2007).
84. Bagenstos & Schlanger, supra note 83, at 748-49; cf Nicholson, supra note 17, at
273-74 (arguing that full recovery of loss of enjoyment is justified in cases where an indi-
vidual suffering from Alzheimer's Disease is wrongfully injured because, despite his or her
preexisting condition, medical research shows that those individuals do not necessarily enjoy
life any less than individuals who live without the disease). But see Bagenstos & Schlanger,
supra note 83, at 776-78 (arguing that "adaptive preferences" theory indicates that injured
parties adapt to their disabilities, that adapted parties do not necessarily see themselves as
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that an individual loses the opportunity to enjoy is the "range of human ac-
tivities."85 Skiing, painting, reading, hiking, hunting, fishing, dancing,
cheerleading and bowling are just a few of the activities for which courts
have awarded loss-of-enjoyment damages.86 In addition, it is important to
note that while most states allow plaintiffs to recover loss-of-enjoyment
damages, these states' classifications of the loss differ. Some jurisdictions
consider loss of enjoyment to be a component or element of general pain
and suffering, while others consider this loss as an entirely separate element
of damages.
b. Loss of life
Unlike loss of enjoyment, loss of life occurs post-mortem.89 One
learned treatise has noted that loss-of-life damages exist to compensate a
decedent "for the destruction of his capacity to carry on and enjoy life's
activities in a way he would have done had he lived."90 A loss-of-life award
should "reflect the life expectancy of the decedent, his recreational and so-
cial activities, [and] his service to others."91 The notion that death must
precede a claim for loss-of-life damages is apparent in the title: the words
indicate that recovery is based on the assumption that death has already
occurred.9 2 Obviously, an individual cannot experience a loss of life prior to
his or her death. 93 At least a few authorities have noted that life between
injury and death is not a necessary requisite to sustaining loss-of-life dam-
94ages.
having lost enjoyment of life, and that jury members or policy makers, who may not be di s-
abled, superimpose their own negative associations of an injury on another individual's en-
joyment of life).




89. BRILL, supra note 17, § 34:1B.
90. Id.
91. Id
92. Durham v. Marberry, 356 Ark. 481, 492, 156 S.W.3d 242, 248 (2004).
93. Id
94. BRILL, supra note 17, § 34:1B. But see Sterner v. Wesley Coll., Inc., 747 F. Supp.
263, 273 (D. Del. 1990) (holding that hedonic damages were only appropriate to measure the




C. Solving the Procedural Due Process Issues Inherent in the Calculation
of Non-Economic Damages
In recent decades, American courts have seen an increase in the size
and availability of both non-economic and hedonic-damage awards.95 As a
result of this increase, a growing portion of the legal community has be-
come concerned with the implications of non-economic theory and the ef-
fect of large non-economic awards on defendants' due process rights.96
Commentators who question the constitutionality of non-economic damage
awards have found that these awards are violative of defendants' due
process rights to the extent that they are excessive, i.e., beyond the scope of
financial liability that the defendant is actually responsible for, and to the
extent that they are not the product of an accurate or principled system or
procedure. 97
Those who find due process issues with non-economic damages base
their arguments on a simple maxim: "[w]ithout tying liability to facts, any
form of 'compensation' [may be] simply an open-ended invitation to trans-
fer wealth from one person to another."98 These individuals assert that to be
legally justified, non-economic awards, or any tort damage award for that
matter, must be based on fact." In addition, they also state that, like other
forms of damages, "if noneconomic compensatory damages involve facts,
one must be able to articulate and establish those facts in a reliable way."
Given the intangible, non-factual nature of non-economic damages like pain
95. Giovanni Comandd, Towards a Global Model for Adjudicating Personal Injury
Damages: Bridging Europe and the United States, 19 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 241, 250-53
(2005); see also DeCamp, supra note 9, at 234; Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 69, at
1046 n.39; Anthony J. Sebok, Translating the Immeasurable: Thinking About Pain and Suf-
fering Comparatively, 55 DEPAUL L. REv. 379, 384-85 (2006). At least one commentator
analyzing both American and European non-economic loss systems has attributed this shift
to the "response of legal systems' demand for protection of individual interests originating in
society[.]" Comandd, supra, at 247-48. Furthermore, this same commentator has noted that
this response "has triggered important modifications in the conceptualization of intangible
loss accompanying both physical and emotional harm." Id.
96. See DeCamp, supra note 9, at 257; see also Geistfeld, supra note 61, at 342; 2 DAN
B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 1051 (2001) ("The claim of pain is therefore a serious threat to
the defendant since, lacking any highly objective components, it permits juries to roam
through their biases in setting an award.").
97. See generally Allen et al., supra note 5; DeCamp, supra note 9; Geistfeld, supra
note 61; Cass R Sunstein, Daniel Kahneman & David Schkade, Assessing Punitive Damages
(with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071 (1998).
98. Allen et al., supra note 5, at 1256.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 1255.
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and suffering or loss of life, however, it is extremely difficult to find a fac-
tual basis for non-economic harm.' 1o
For example, consider the amount of pain and suffering that two dif-
ferent burn victims endure. During the course of the same fire, one burn
victim sustained third-degree burns over eighty to ninety percent of his
body; the other received second-degree burns on his right arm. While both
likely experienced severe pain, it would be rational to assume that the vic-
tim with the more severe burns over a majority of his body experienced
more pain and suffering than the other victim in this scenario. Nonetheless,
in terms of non-economic damages, how are juries able to quantify the dif-
ference? 02 Furthermore, what guidance or instruction, if any, aids jurors'
factual determinations as to the amount of these intangible harms? 10 3
1. The Supreme Court's Limitations on Punitive Damages Awards
Recently, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence regarding the constitutio-
nality of punitive damages awards has provided helpful insight into the limi-
tations that due process imposes on intangible damages calculations in gen-
eral. ' Over the past twenty years, the Supreme Court has become increa-
singly discontent with the amount of discretion afforded jurors in calculat-
ing punitive damages awards. 05 Specifically, by recently imposing both
101. Id.; DeCamp, supra note 9, at 261-62. Paul DeCamp has noted that
[i]n the end, all that an award of noneconomic compensatory damages is,
and all that it can be under current practice, is a dollar amount agreed to
by a sufficient number of jurors, through a secret process, based on un-
disclosed considerations largely divorced from the evidence presented in
the case . ... The jurors debate the matter and arrive at a figure with
which the requisite number ofjurors can agree. This is the very definition
of arbitrariness ....
Id. Contra Stephan Landsman, In Praise of Uncertainty: A Response to Professor Allen, 56
DEPAUL L. REv. 1279, 1282 (2007) ("We live in a world where a great deal cannot be re-
duced to the certainty of explicit proof . . . It is not that the jury is perfect-no human sys-
tem of measurement can be-but rather that it speaks with the authority of our polity.").
102. Allen et al., supra note 5, at 1256.
103. In their article concerning the nature and regulation of non-economic damages,
Ronald J. Allen, Alexia Brunet and Susan Spies Roth provide a helpful account of the issue
concerning the fact of the matter in non-economic damage awards. Allen et al., supra note 5,
at 1264. These authors argue that in order to truthfully establish the fact of the matter in-
volved in non-economic damages, i.e., the value of the victim's non-economic harm, jurors
must rely on objective evidence instead of their subjective notions of what the value should
be. Id.
104. See generally Allen et al., supra note 5; DeCamp, supra note 9; Sunstein et al.,
supra note 97.
105. DeCamp, supra note 9, at 233.
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substantive and procedural limitations on punitive damages awards, the
Court has essentially moved away from its previous position of "hands-off
approval of common-law practice for awarding and reviewing punitive
damages to an express recognition of a right not to be subjected to grossly
excessive punitive damage awards."' 06 As a result, regarding this express
recognition, the Court has "dramatically increased the scope of judicial in-
volvement in reviewing punitive damages awards for excessiveness." 07
Early on in the transition from "hands-off' to more extensive over-
sight, the Court was hesitant to sustain challenges to punitive damages
awards and merely hinted at its underlying concerns. 0 8 For example, in
Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,'" the Court admitted that "un-
limited jury discretion-or unlimited judicial discretion for that matter-in
the fixing of punitive damages may invite extreme results that jar one's con-
stitutional sensibilities."'10 Though it eventually upheld the jury's award,
the Court considered the extent to which jurors were guided in their calcula-
tion and whether such guidance "reasonably accommodated Pacific Mu-
tual's interests."'" Ultimately, the Court held that "as long as [a juror's dis-
cretion in calculating punitive damages] is exercised within reasonable con-
straints, due process is satisfied."ll 2
Later in the shift, the Court considered more seriously the due process
implications behind the calculation of punitive damages awards. For in-
stance, in Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg,"'3 the Court held that Oregon's stan-
dard of reviewing punitive damages awards was unconstitutional because it
"ensur[ed] only that there [was] evidence to support some punitive damages,
not that there is evidence to support the amount actually awarded."ll 4 The
Court found that this some-evidence standard "abrogat[ed] . . . a well-
established common-law protection against arbitrary deprivations of proper-
ty" and that, by doing so, it "raised a presumption that it violate[d] the Due
Process Clause."' '5 In explaining its holding, the Court stated that:
Punitive damages pose an acute danger of arbitrary deprivation of prop-
erty. Jury instructions typically leave the jury with wide discretion in
106. Id at 268.
107. Id. at 233.
108. See id. at 268-78.
109. 499 U.S. I (1991).
110. Id. at 18.
111. Id. at 19-20.
112. Id. at 20.
113. 512 U.S. 415 (1994).
114. Id. at 429.
115. Id. at 430 ("When the absent procedures would have provided protection against
arbitrary and inaccurate adjudication, this Court has not hesitated to find the proceedings
violative of due process.").
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choosing amounts, and the presentation of evidence of a defendant's net
worth creates the potential that juries will use their verdicts to express
biases against big businesses, particularly those without strong local pre-
sences. Judicial review of the amount awarded was one of the few pro-
cedural safeguards which the common law provided against that danger.
Oregon has removed that safeguard without providing any substitute
procedure and without any indication that the danger of arbitrary awards
has in any way subsided over time. For these reasons, we hold that Ore-
gon's denial of judicial review of the size of punitive damages awards
violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.116
Finally, in the last stages of its shift, the Court particularized the stan-
dards that due process required in both the size of punitive damages awards
and the amount of guidance give to jurors. First, in BMW ofNorth America,
Inc. v. Gore,"7 the Court held that "[t]he Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment prohibits a State from imposing a 'grossly excessive'
punishment on a tortfeasor."" 8 Concerning this concept, the Court stated
that a punitive damages award is "grossly excessive," and in the "zone of
arbitrariness that violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment," if it bears no relation to a state's legitimate interests in using
punitive damages to punish and deter."19
Second, in State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Camp-
bell,12 0 the Court noted that it had increased "concern[] over the imprecise
manner in which punitive damages systems are administered."'21 Specifical-
ly, the Court stated that it had heightened concern "when the decisionmaker
is presented . . . with evidence that has little bearing as to the amount of
punitive damages that should be awarded." 22 The Court further clarified
that "[v]ague instructions, or those that merely inform the jury to avoid
'passion or prejudice' do little to aid the decisionmaker in its task of assess-
ing appropriate weight to evidence that is relevant and evidence that is tan-
gential or only inflammatory." 23 In the end, the Court firmly established a
de novo standard of appellate review of potentially unconstitutional punitive
damage awards.' 24 Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy noted that
116. Id. at 432.
117. 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
118. Id. at 562 (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 454
(1993)).
119. Id. at 568.
120. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
121. Id. at 417.
122. Id.




"[e]xacting appellate review ensures that an award of punitive damages is
based upon an application of law, rather than a decisionmaker's caprice."l 25
Third, in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker,126 the Court established for the
first time a bright-line, mathematical limit on punitive damage awards. 27
While the Court's decision in Exxon is limited to punitive damages claims
arising under federal maritime law, a few commentators have considered it
to be telling of the Court's current disposition regarding the limit that due
process places on punitive awards in general.12 8 For instance, in the majority
opinion, the Court reiterated the concerns it had expressed in Honda Motor
Co. and State Farm concerning the arbitrary and unpredictable nature of
punitive awards.129 In doing so, the Court mentioned that for purposes of
reviewing punitive awards in general, verbal limitations on jurors deciding
the amount of punitive damages are likely insufficient to guard against "un-
predictable outlier" awards.130
The Court stated that its rationale behind this position was that
"[i]nstructions can go just so far in promoting systematic consistency when
awards are not tied to specifically proven items of damage (the cost of med-
ical treatment, say).,,131 To explain this rationale, the Court drew from its
experience with the federal sentencing system. 132 The Court found this ex-
perience instructive and noted that:
in the old federal sentencing system of general standards the cohort of
even the most seasoned judicial penalty-givers defied consistency.
Judges and defendants alike were "[1]eft at large, wandering in deserts of
uncharted discretion," which is very much the position of those impos-
ing punitive damages today, be they judges or juries, except that they
lack even a statutory maximum; their only restraint beyond a core sense
of fairness is the due process limit.133
In the Court's mind, the development of the federal sentencing system
"suggest[ed] that as long 'as there are no punitive-damages guidelines, cor-
responding to the federal and state sentencing guidelines, it is inevitable that
125. Id.
126. 554 U.S. 471 (2008).
127. Michael L. Brooks, Note, Uncharted Waters: The Supreme Court Plots The Course
to a Constitutional Bright-Line Restriction on Punitive Awards in Exxon Shipping Co. v.
Baker, 62 OKLA. L. REv. 497, 497 (2010).
128. See generally id. at 519-25.
129. Exxon, 554 U.S. at 497-501.
130. Id. at 504.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 505-06.
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the specific amount of punitive damages awarded whether by a judge or by
a jury will be arbitrary."l 34
2. Finding Solutions in the Supreme Court's Due Process
Considerations
Under a comparative analysis, several commentators have drawn atten-
tion to the substantially common background of both punitive and non-
economic damages and use phrases such as "largely undifferentiated and ...
interchangeable" to describe the relationship of punitive and non-economic
damages during the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries.' 3 1 In
light of this common nature, these commentators have found that the
"common history and treatment [of punitive and non-economic damages],
the inadequate guidance available to juries, the amorphous nature of the
jury's task, the absence of objective criteria to safeguard against considera-
tion of improper factors, and the lack of clear standards to facilitate mea-
ningful judicial review of verdicts" within the context of awarding non-
economic damages obviate the suitability of the Supreme Court's recent
limitations on punitive damages awards for use in crafting procedural safe-
guards for non-economic damages calculation.'3 6
a. Guidance for jurors: comparability review
Ultimately, a method of calculation or procedure that affords jurors the
discretion to award non-economic damages awards without relying on any
objective criteria is simply not in keeping with the Supreme Court's due
process standards.137 To the extent that the Supreme Court's interpretation
of the Due Process clause requires guidance for jurors in their non-
economic damages calculations, and to the extent that the issue of non-
economic damages is an issue of fact, jurors "should be provided with evi-
dence to permit a reasoned valuation of the harms at issue."' 3 8 Apart from
134. Id at 506.
135. DeCamp, supra note 9, at 233. Commentator Paul DeCamp observes that American
courts followed English decisions regarding this issue and that these courts "eventually
settl[ed] into a pattern of reviewing all types of damages for 'passion or prejudice' or inquir-
ing whether the verdict 'shock[ed] the conscience."' Id at 236. See generally id at 242-48.
136. Id. at 291. Members of the Supreme Court have also recognized the correlation
between the unconstitutional effects of punitive damages and those of non-economic damag-
es. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 446-47 (2001) (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting) ("One million dollars' worth of pain and suffering does not exist as a
'fact' in the world any more or less than one million dollars' worth of moral outrage." (cita-
tion omitted)).
137. Id. at 291-92.
138. Id. at 292; see also Mark A. Geistfeld, Constitutional Tort Reform, 38 Loy. L.A. L.
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evidence concerning the nature and severity of a plaintiffs injuries, juries
need evidence that will assist them in calculating an accurate amount as to
monetary damages.139 "The only meaningful guide that a jury can have in
this regard is to be informed of the range of awards for injuries factually
comparable to the harms that the plaintiff claims to have suffered." 4 0
Such a process is commonly known as comparability review.141 Essen-
tially, "[c]omparability review involves comparing the present case to deci-
sions rendered in similar cases."l 42 Within the context of calculating non-
economic damages awards, comparability review involves a four-step pro-
cedure. First, the court orders the parties to submit briefs "regarding the
cases they believe establish the appropriate range [of non-economic damag-
es].43 Second, the court then "determine[s] as a matter of law which cases
are most closely analogous to the set of facts that the plaintiff asserts will be
proved at trial."'" Third, with the help of the parties, the court then "ad-
just[s] [the range] figures for inflation so that older verdicts do not unduly
depress the range."1 45 Finally, if the jury ultimately returns a verdict that is
above the range, the court then exercises judicial oversight by reviewing the
jury's verdict for reasonableness. 146
Overall, the purpose of this endeavor is to calculate an objectively rea-
sonable range that the jury can consider in its factual determinations regard-
ing the plaintiffs non-economic loss. 147 Because the range serves as an ob-
REv.1093, 1103-08 (2005).
139. DeCamp, supra note 9, at 292.
140. Id
141. Allen et al., supra note 5, at 1258.
142. Id
143. DeCamp, supra note 9, at 293. Professors Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein
observe that if juries are to be afforded a strong role in making intangible harm determina-
tions, then courts must provide objective guidance. Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Dol-
lars and Death, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. 537, 587-88 (2005). Specifically, Posner and Sunstein
argue that courts should present value of statistical life (VSL) studies to juries faced with a
loss-of-life determination. Id They too note the tension between Seventh Amendment rights
and the need for a more objective measure of damages; this note presents a general discus-
sion of the matter. See infra note 147. However, due to the fact that "juries are not well
equipped to answer [questions concerning the value of life]," Posner and Sunstein state their
preference for "judge-set" awards where judges begin with a VSL figure and then make
appropriate adjustments. Posner & Sunstein, supra, at 588.
144. DeCamp, supra note 9, at 293.
145. Id
146. Id at 295.
147. Id at 294. Any reader finding a distinction between punitive damages and non-
economic damages on Seventh Amendment grounds would not be amiss in his or her discov-
ery. Historically, compensatory damages have been treated as issues of fact for the jury. Id
at 290. However, in its most recent punitive-damages jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has
treated punitive damages awards as matters of law and not matters of fact. Id at 290-91. In
reviewing punitive damages awards, the Supreme Court conducts an "exacting" review to
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jective standard, jurors may more accurately calculate the monetary value of
their damages assessment and avoid imposing completely arbitrary judg-
ments. For instance, "telling jurors that awards for a given kind of injury
have tended to range between $50,000 and $600,000 provides the jurors
with a great deal more context than they" otherwise would have under a no-
guidance regime.14 8
b. Two-tiered system of appellate review
Commentators assert that the commonalities between punitive and
non-economic damages also justify the application of the Supreme Court's
more "exacting" de novo review to non-economic awards.14 9 However,
these commentators also assert that only a less-strict abuse-of-discretion
review is necessary in cases where a jury's award falls within the range of
acceptable awards created by comparability review. 5 0 In cases where a jury
returns a verdict within the range of comparable awards, commentators ar-
gue for an abuse-of-discretion standard of review; in cases where the jury
returns a verdict that exceeds the range, commentators have argued that
application of the more exacting de novo standard of review is a necessary
requisite to a constitutional non-economic damages calculation.'
determine whether that award is excessive or otherwise unconstitutional. Id. Regardless of
this treatment, however, due process issues still exist in the determination of non-economic
damages. Id. at 291.
The similarities between punitive damages and noneconomic compensatory
damages-including their common history and treatment, the inadequate guid-
ance available to juries, the amorphous nature of the jury's task, the absence of
objective criteria to safeguard against consideration of improper factors, and the
lack of clear standards to facilitate meaningful judicial review of verdicts-
logically call for comparable treatment for purposes of procedural due process.
Id. Query, however, whether non-economic loss determinations are more "fact-dependent ...
than judicial inquir[ies] into probable cause or reasonable suspicion under the Fourth
Amendment, proportionality of criminal punishments under the Eighth Amendment, or ex-
cessiveness of punitive damages under the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 291. Some argue
that judicial review of non-economic damage awards is not constrained by Seventh Amend-
ment strictures. Id. at 290-92. The premise behind this argument is that the Seventh
Amendment's Reexamination Clause does not preclude careful judicial scrutiny of noneco-
nomic compensatory damages verdicts any more than it prevents scrutiny of punitive damage
awards. Id Furthermore, others point to pre-Seventh Amendment acceptance of comparabili-
ty review and reviewing non-economic awards for excessiveness. Id.
148. Id. at 294.
149. Id. at 296-97.




D. Solving the Procedural Due Process Issues Inherent in Arkansas's
Loss-of-Life Jurisprudence
By definition, loss-of-life damages are post-mortem hedonic damag-
es.15 2 Given this note's previous discussion of the issue,153 this means that
loss-of-life damages fall under the broader category of non-economic dam-
ages and that the calculation of these two types of damages create many, if
not all, of the same problems, e.g., the intangible nature of both loss-of-life
damages and other types of non-economic damages (such as pain and suf-
fering) make it difficult for juries to calculate such damages with any
amount of precision.
The combined effect of Arkansas's loss-of-life jurisprudence and the
little to no guidance available to jurors in calculating loss-of-life damages is
troubling. Such conditions are ripe for reconsideration given the Supreme
Court's recent clarification of the due process standards implicated in the
calculation of punitive damages awards. In an attempt to address these is-
sues, the following section will accomplish three things: first, it will discuss
the development of Arkansas's common-law regarding loss-of-life damag-
es; second, this section will attempt to uncover the components within this
common law that have the potential to infringe on defendants' procedural
due process rights and third, this section will offer a two-tiered solution to
the identified problems.
1. The Development of Arkansas's Loss-of-Life Jurisprudence
In 2004, the Arkansas Supreme Court interpreted the 2001 amendment
for the first time in Durham v. Marbeny.154 After consulting other jurisdic-
tions' holdings,'"' the court distinguished loss-of-life damages from loss-of-
enjoyment-of-life damages by stating that loss-of-enjoyment-of-life damag-
es constitute hedonic damages that a decedent experiences before death,
whereas loss-of-life damages begin "accruing at the point when life is lost,
at death."' 6 From this finding, the court reasoned that it was not necessary
for the decedent to have lived between the time of injury and death in order
for plaintiffs to recover loss-of-life damages under the amendment's lan-
guage. 57 Additionally, the court provided a method for calculating loss-of-
life damages by holding that "[l]oss-of-life damages seek to compensate a
152. BRILL, supra note 17, § 34:1B.
153. See supra text accompanying notes 69-94.
154. Durham v. Marberry, 356 Ark. 481,487-88, 156 S.W.3d 242, 245-46 (2004).
155. The court referenced Connecticut's, Hawaii's, and New Mexico's holdings on post-
mortem hedonic damages. Durham, 356 Ark. at 488-91, 156 S.W.3d at 245-48.
156. Id. at 492, 156 S.W.3d at 248.
157. Id., 156 S.W.3d at 248-49.
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decedent for the loss of the value that the decedent would have placed on
his or her own life."' 58 As far as evidence of this value was concerned, the
court noted that Arkansas had no "hard and fast rule to determine compen-
satory damages for non-pecuniary losses."159
Three years later, in McMullin v. United States,'" the Eastern District
of Arkansas reviewed the Arkansas Supreme Court's loss-of-life calculation
set out in Durham.161 Although the district court recognized that the lan-
guage of the Arkansas Supreme Court's loss-of-life calculation appeared to
form a subjective standard, it ultimately found that there was no express
indication that the method was inconsistent with the majority objective ap-
proach.162 Nonetheless, in calculating the value of the decedent's life, the
district court still sought to determine the value that the decedent would
have placed on his life.163 In addition to its findings on Arkansas's loss-of-
life calculation, the court interpreted the Durham decision to indicate that
"many types of evidence . . . may properly be admitted and relied upon to
establish how to place a value on the deceased's life."'" Interestingly, in
158. Id., 156 S.W.3d at 248. In light of the court's language in Durham, it is important to
consider how such a determination would be possible in cases involving a viable fetus or an
individual who demonstrated a lack of value for his or her own life. Compare Plaintiff s Trial
Brief, Ford v. United States, 640 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (E.D. Ark. 2009), No.4:08-CV-00176,
2010 WL 1689329 (arguing that decedent valued his life despite the fact that he committed
suicide), with Defendant's Post-Trial Brief, Ford v. United States, 640 F. Supp. 2d 1065
(E.D. Ark. 2009), No.4:08-CV-00176, 2010 WL 1689332 (arguing that estate could not show
that decedent placed some value on his life because he committed suicide).
159. Durham, 356 Ark. at 493, 156 S.W.3d at 249.
160. McMullin v. United States, 515 F. Supp. 2d 914 (E.D. Ark. 2007).
16 1. Id.
162. Id. at 926.
163. Id. at 926-28. The court used language such as "[n]aturally this child never made
any statements purporting to indicate directly how he would value his own life," and
"[c]ertainly Garret would have considered his life most valuable." Id. at 928.
164. Id at 927. On its face, Arkansas's method for calculating loss-of-life damages asks
jurors to imagine the value that a particular decedent would have placed on his or her life.
The type of evidence that Arkansas courts have considered consists of the decedent's rela-
tionship to his or her family, the job that the decedent occupied and the opportunities that the
decedent had available to him or her. Given the negligible amount of guidance in calculating
loss-of-life values, who is to say that loss-of-life valuations will not turn into socioeconomic-
based decisions? For instance, the young boy in McMullin had a loving, caring family. The
court found that the boy would have had many opportunities to live an emotionally and fi-
nancially successful life. But what about those young boys and girls without a home or op-
portunities like the McMullin boy? Will their loss-of-life awards be comparable? If not, is the
Arkansas loss-of-life scheme to suggest that there is somehow a correlation between an indi-
vidual's socioeconomic status and his or her capacity to enjoy life or appreciate the value of
lost life? Beyond socioeconomic status, consider factors such as family and amount of prod-
uctivity. The Pope court found that the decedent was a mother, that she and her oldest daugh-
ter were close, and that she had worked as a waitress for several years. However, what if she
had strained relationships with her family members? What if that decedent did not have a
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making its own determination, the court considered evidence such as the
decedent's parents' concern for the decedent's well-being, the protective
and supportive home that the decedent would have likely had, the likelihood
that the decedent would have received a good education, and the likelihood
that the decedent would have experienced married life and parenthood. 165
The next year, in One National Bank v. Pope,16 the Arkansas Supreme
Court had the opportunity to respond to the district court's findings in
McMullin. In Pope, the court agreed with the McMullin court's finding that
the method of calculation set out in Durham was consistent with the majori-
ty's objective approach.167 According to the court's holding in Pope, this
meant that plaintiffs had to "present some evidence, that the decedent va-
lued his or her life, from which a jury could infer and derive that value and
on which it could base an award of damages." 6 8 Further, it meant that a
showing that the decedent lived and died was insufficient to recover loss-of-
life damages. 169 In considering the likelihood that there would be limited
direct evidence of a decedent's value of his or her life, the court held that
circumstantial evidence could also be used to establish loss-of-life damag-
170es.
In a manner similar to the Eastern District's approach in McMullin, the
court in Pope looked to circumstantial evidence to determine whether the
decedent valued her life.' 7 ' The court found that the trial testimony showed
that the decedent was a mother of four as well as a grandmother, that she
and her oldest daughter were close, that she was a waitress and that at the
time of the car accident that killed her, the decedent was on her way to a
family gathering.172 The court considered this "circumstantial evidence [to
family? Moreover, what if she was disabled to the point that she was not capable of being a
moderately productive individual? Is the lack of this type of evidence an indication that an
individual valued his or her life any less than someone with close family relationships or a
high level of productivity? Should the value of lost life be distinguishable on such factors?
Remember, although most compensatory damage calculations are based on pecuniary or
socioeconomic factors, the underlying purpose of hedonic damages is to compensate individ-
uals for intangible losses that are divorced from economic class or status. See supra Part Ul.
165. Id at 928.
166. One Nat'l Bank v. Pope, 372 Ark. 208, 272 S.W.3d 98 (2008).
167. Id at 214, 272 S.W.3d at 102. But see Lee v. Overbey, 2009 WL 4829107, at *1
(W.D. Ark. Dec. 8, 2009) ("Although difficult to place a monetary value on a life, it seems
clear that the Court should consider testimonial evidence of the decedent, to include state-
ments made or actions taken by him tending to prove the subjective value he placed on his
life." (emphasis added) (citing McMullin v. United States, 515 F. Supp. 2d 914, 923 (E.D.
Ark. 2007))).
168. One Nat'l Bank, 372 Ark. at 214, 272 S.W.3d at 102-03.
169. Id, 272 S.W.3d at 102.
170. Id, 272 S.W.3d at 103.
171. Id. at 215, 272 S.W.3d at 103.
172. Id., 272 S.W.3d at 103.
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be] substantial evidence from which the jury could have inferred the value
that [the decedent] would have placed on her life."l 73
2. A Critique ofArkansas's Loss-of-Life Law
Admittedly, as is the case with determining non-economic damages
awards, calculating loss-of-life damages is far from an exacting science.174
Unquestionably, however, given the Supreme Court's recent punitive dam-
ages jurisprudence, due process at the very least requires some semblance of
a procedure as well as sufficient guidance for jurors in awarding loss-of-life
damages. If Arkansas's loss-of-life calculation cannot connect a defen-
dant's liability to facts or some objective criteria, then it is nothing more
than a conduit for an arbitrary transfer of wealth from one party to another;
thus, in this sense, it is violative of a defendant's procedural due process
rights. 175 For a loss-of-life calculation to pass constitutional muster, it must
provide jurors sufficient guidance for returning an award that has some fac-
tual basis.17 6
The dangers associated with loss-of-life damages are no different than
those associated with punitive damages. Both are intangible in nature. Both
can lead to an arbitrary deprivation of property. Both arise in cases where
there is a potential for jurors' emotions and sensibilities to become inflamed
and in cases where those emotions can become determinative of the size of
damages awards. Yet, while the Supreme Court has set standards for guid-
ance and procedure, Arkansas's loss-of-life jurisprudence contains no such
safeguards. Though Arkansas's loss-of-life calculation approaches at least a
normative ground, it does not offer jurors any real guidance to a factually
sound award. The Arkansas Supreme Court's holdings in Durham and Pope
seem to tell jurors the following:
You need to determine the value that the decedent would have placed on
his or her own life. In performing this task, all you have to do is find
some evidence of this value. Given the likely absence of direct evidence,
you may use circumstantial evidence in your calculation. It is too diffi-
cult to formulate a "hard and fast rule" for determining non-pecuniary
losses, so just do the best you can.
173. Id., 272 S.W.3d at 103.
174. Durham v. Marberry, 356 Ark. 481, 493, 156 S.W.3d 242, 249 (2004).
175. See Allen et al., supra note 5, at 1256.
176. See id. at 1274.
177. See One Nat'l Bank, 372 Ark. at 214, 272 S.W.3d at 102-03; Durham, 356 Ark. at
492-93, 156 S.W.3d at 248-49. In addition, the Arkansas Model Jury Instructions (Civil) do




When considering the current state of Arkansas's loss-of-life law, there
are obvious questions. For instance, how is such a standard distinguishable
from Oregon's standard of review for punitive damages awards in Honda
Motor Co. v. Oberg? How does the law in Arkansas do any better than the
"desert of uncharted discretion" that the Supreme Court describes in Exxon
Shipping Co. v. Baker? How is any loss-of-life award resulting from such a
legal structure ultimately not arbitrary? Granted, Arkansas jurors must find
some evidence on which to base their valuations; but, what is there to help
them match a monetary figure to the value of lost life? Just like Oregon's
abrogation of common-law protections against arbitrary deprivations of
property in Honda Motor, the lack of guidance for jurors and the lack of
procedural safeguards in Arkansas's loss-of-life system raise a presumption
of a violation of due process.
Concededly, the intangible nature of loss-of-life damages makes it dif-
ficult to fashion a "hard and fast rule" that will ensure that Arkansas juries
return awards based entirely on fact: loss-of-life damages of course "involve
considerations beyond the facts of a given case." 78 However, despite the
challenging nature of this task, no amount of difficulty could ever justify
sustaining a procedure that arbitrarily deprives defendants of their property.
Though any loss-of-life calculation ultimately deals in approximations,
there are methods that yield more accurate results than others. Considering
the Supreme Court's primary concern for guiding juries and limiting the
potential for excessive awards, it would seem that the most accurate approx-
imation of a decedent's loss of life would be preferable. 179 While it may still
178. DeCamp, supra note 9, at 257.
179. Allen et al., supra note 5, at 1266. Although this concern for accurate fact finding is
not clear from the language in the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments, many scholars have
found it implicit in the Supreme Court's three factor test in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S.
319 (1976), and in several of the Court's holdings in other cases. Id. at 1265-66. Under Ar-
kansas common law, however, there is the well-established rule that "in those instances
where damages simply cannot be proven with exactness, when the cause and existence of
damages have been established by the evidence, recovery will not be denied merely because
the damages cannot be determined with exactness." Mine Creek Contractors, Inc. v.
Grandstaff, 300 Ark. 516, 522, 780 S.W.2d 543, 545 (1989); see also BRILL, supra note 17, §
4:5. Recently, in Agracat Inc. v. AFS-NWA, LLC, 2010 Ark. App. 458, SW.3d _ the
Arkansas Court of Appeals applied this rule in its review of a directed verdict in a breach of
fiduciary duty case. The court stated that "Arkansas law has never insisted on exactness of
proof in determining damages, and [that] if it is reasonably certain that some loss occurred, it
is enough that damages can be stated only approximately." Agracat, 2010 Ark. App. 458, at
7, _S.W.3d _; see also Morton v. Park View Apartments, 315 Ark. 400, 406, 868
S.W.2d 448, 451 (1993). While providing an example of this rule's application, the court
referenced the jury's calculation of loss-of-life damages in One National Bank v. Pope, 372
Ark. 208, 272 S.W.3d 98 (2008), and said that "the supreme court reversed [the trial court's
directed verdict], holding that the estate produced substantial evidence from which the jury
could have inferred or derived the value that the decedent placed on her life." Agracat, 2010
Ark. App. 458, at 8-9, _S.W.3d____ _. In light of the courts' holdings in these cases, it
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yield only approximations, an approach that is more principled than Arkan-
sas's loss-of-life calculation is desirable.
3. A Two-Step Solution to the Due Process Issue
For Arkansas's loss-of-life law to reach a constitutionally acceptable
level of accuracy, it must reasonably guide jurors to accurate assessments of
hedonic loss. 80 Furthermore, in order to insure that loss-of-life awards are
must be said that this note does not argue that a lack of procedural safeguards requires sys-
tematic denial of loss-of-life damages. Instead, this note assumes that recovery for loss of life
is acceptable in cases where jurors have sufficient guidance and where there are limitations
on juror discretion. Approximations are a necessary requisite to a determination of loss-of-
life damages because there is no market value for lost life. What is also necessary, however,
is the addition of procedural safeguards that validate the Supreme Court's recent clarification
of due process limitations. It is not that all loss-of-life awards produced under the current
system are unconstitutional per se; it is that the current system poses a real threat of produc-
ing loss-of-life awards that may offend the Supreme Court's notions of due process.
180. As an aside, there seemingly is justification to vary loss of enjoyment awards to the
extent that individuals experience different injuries and corresponding losses in experiencing
life's pleasures. For example, not every tort victim that loses an arm or leg enjoys playing
sports. Similarly, not every individual that loses his or her sight enjoys watching the movie
Pride and Prejudice. Under these circumstances, individualized determinations of loss-of-
enjoyment awards are justified because these tort victims experience varying levels of loss.
See Lind, supra note 9, at 322 (arguing that comparability review fails to treat intangible loss
as unique to each tort victim). However, individualized calculations of loss-of-life awards
may not be justified on the same grounds. With respect to his or her life, every wrongful-
death victim experiences the same harm in the same manner: each loses his or her life and
the ability to carry on life's activities. Consequently, an alternative solution to Arkansas's
due process issues with respect to loss-of-life damages might be to treat each life the same
i.e. the Arkansas General Assembly could fix the value of life at a certain amount for purpos-
es of recovery under ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-62-101. Looking to the 9/11 compensation fund
for guidance, other commentators have also argued for fixed amounts of non-economic dam-
ages. See Walker, supra note 57, at 616-27. Under the Air Transportation Safety and System
Stabilization Act, 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2006), Congress created the 9/11 compensation fund.
Under the Act, survivors could waive a wrongful-death action and receive an individualized
settlement amount. Kenneth Feinberg, Special Master of the fund, created an income-based
chart in order to calculate these individualized amounts. However, as far as non-economic
damages were concerned, Feinberg unilaterally awarded one sum, $250,000.00, to each
victim. Due to his experience with the 9/11 fund, Feinberg was later asked to design and
administer a privately funded compensation system for the victims of the Virginia Tech
shootings. Kenneth Feinberg, What is the Value of A Human Life?, NPR, May 25, 2008,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld-90760725. In a short internet article,
Feinberg described how his experience with the 9/11 fund informed the structure of the Vir-
ginia Tech compensation fund. Id. ("I felt it would make more sense for Congress to provide
the same amount of public compensation to each and every victim-to declare, in effect, that
all lives are equal. . . . I believe that public compensation should avoid financial distinctions
which only fuel the hurt and grief of the survivors. I believe that all lives should be treated
the same."). Despite the fact that Feinberg considers the equality-of-life notion within the
context of public compensation, his arguments are readily transferrable to loss-of-life consid-
326 [Vol. 33
TORT LAW
not arbitrary or excessive as a matter of law, Arkansas appellate courts
should adopt a two-tiered system of appellate review. Because hedonic
damages are a subset of non-economic damages, the proposed revisions to
non-economic loss calculation are readily applicable to Arkansas's loss-of-
life calculation. These proposed revisions are three-fold.' 8'
First, in order to ensure that juries return accurate loss-of-life awards,
Arkansas courts should inform jurors of a range of loss-of-life awards given
in factually similar cases.182 This remedy could proceed in this manner: to
begin, courts could order briefs on the appropriate range of awards. Given
that there are only a few Arkansas cases involving loss-of-life damages,
parties may have to look to other loss-of-life jurisdictions like Connecticut,
Hawaii or New Mexico for factually similar cases.18 3 After reviewing the
parties' briefs, the court could then determine the appropriate range as a
matter of law. However, if the cases used in the range determination are
older, the court may permit the parties to assist in making adjustments based
on inflation. Once final, the range should be presented to the jury with in-
structions notifying the jurors that the range shows prior loss-of-life awards
from factually similar cases.
Second, trial courts could review loss-of-life awards that exceed the
range. ' Unquestionably, the standard for excessiveness should come from
the examples themselves. 85 If there is a deviation from the standard, there
must be differentiating facts that justify the deviation.'86 Furthermore, if a
court is to justify a deviation, there should be a direct correlation between
the extent of the deviation and the significance of the differences.' 87 In the
event that the factual distinctions do not justify the larger award, the court
erations because there is no reason to assume that the value of life would differ when consi-
dered in a private suit context as opposed to a public compensation context. Of course, the
problem with this solution is Article 5, Section 32 of the Arkansas Constitution, which states
that "no law shall be enacted limiting the amount to be recovered for injuries resulting in
death or for injuries to persons or property." ARK. CONST. art. V, § 32.
181. DeCamp, supra note 9, at 292-95.
182. Id at 292.
183. Other than Arkansas, the only states that currently allow for recovery of post-
mortem hedonic damages are Connecticut, Hawaii, New Hampshire and New Mexico. Bra-
dy, supra note 46, at 131. However, it should be noted that the New Hampshire Senate re-
cently passed legislation that removes the statutory language providing for the recovery of
damages for "the probable duration of life but for the injury" and damages "in connection
with other elements allowed by law, in the same manner as if the deceased had survived."
S.B. 468, 2010 Leg., 10-2735 Sess. (N.H. 2010) ("This act shall take effect January 1,
2011.").
184. DeCamp, supra note 9, at 294-95.
185. Id.




should consider remittitur. 88 Regardless of whether the verdict falls above
or below the established range, the court should review the award for rea-
sonableness.
Third, appellate courts should implement a two-tiered standard of review
when reviewing appeals of loss-of-life awards. In cases where the jury re-
turns a verdict within the range of comparable awards, appellate courts
should apply an abuse of discretion standard of review. As a means of re-
cognizing the objective reasonableness of within-range awards, this lower
standard will provide greater deference. However, in cases where the ver-
dict exceeds the range maximum, appellate courts should apply the more
"exacting" de novo standard of review. 189 This higher standard will provide
less deference to these awards because they could represent a capricious or
arbitrary decision.
IV. CONCLUSION
The value of lost life occupies both real and philosophical significance
in our society. If a state's tort damages system goes so far as to provide in-
dependent recovery for loss-of-life damages, then it must also ensure that
the awards stay true to their underlying purpose. The effects of Arkansas's
current procedure for awarding loss-of-life damages are undesirable and
must be remedied. The intellectually honest approach would be to admit
that loss-of-life calculation does not lend itself to precision and to attempt a
procedure that promotes the best possible level of accuracy. For instance,
guiding juries with factually similar examples mitigates the potential for
arbitrary decisions. Furthermore, judicial review of potentially excessive
loss-of-life awards would further protect the integrity of Arkansas's damag-
es system by reducing the appearance of an arbitrary method of calculation.
While not perfect, these provisions promote a more accurate approach than
Arkansas's current method of calculation and at the very least represent the
lesser of two evils.
Similarly, though the 2001 amendment language is difficult to recon-
cile with either of the historical purposes behind wrongful death and surviv-
al statutes, it is not necessary to completely forgo permitting recovery of
loss-of-life damages. The more appropriate way of allowing plaintiffs to
recover the value of a decedent's lost life would be to amend the Arkansas
wrongful-death statute with language that allowed an estate or beneficiaries
to recover wrongful-death damages based on the loss that the estate sus-
tained as a result of the decedent's death. After this revision, Arkansas
188. Id.
189. Id. at 296-97.
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courts could construe loss to the estate as including a decedent's loss-of-life
damages.
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